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Dealing with the Past: A Proposed Model for Information Redaction under 
the Stormont House Agreement 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper is designed to assist efforts to narrow the gap between the different actors 
on the outstanding issues preventing the establishment of the various past-focused 
institutions contained in the Stormont House Agreement (2014). In particular, it 
suggests an independent judicial mechanism that could make determinations on 
balancing the state’s responsibilities to protect people, with the truth-recovery related 
rights of families affected by the conflict. It focuses, in particular, on the workings of 
the Historical Investigations Unit (HIU). In the interests of harmonising as much as 
possible the work of the Stormont House Agreement institutions, the proposed 
mechanism could be used to make independent determinations in any analogous 
disputes between the Independent Commission on Information Retrieval (ICIR) and 
the British or Irish governments or indeed any disagreements which might arise with 
regard to the other agreed mechanisms in the SHA. 
Underpinning Principles 
 
Having examined in some detail the relevant UK and European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence in particular, as well as analogous practical experience in the UK 
and elsewhere, a number of working assumptions have emerged which have 
underpinned and been incorporated into the model proposed below: 
 
 Families who have lost relatives as a direct result of the conflict have a right to 
truth and the right to an investigation into the circumstances of such deaths, 
which is compliant with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
 The State has an obligation to provide Article 2 compliant investigations in all 
conflict-related deaths. 
 States have a legal obligation to protect all persons within their jurisdiction 
from harm. In tightly defined circumstances (see Appendix 1), this may 
necessitate proportionate restrictions on disclosure to protect the effectiveness 
of operational methods of the police and other security services which are in 
current use and which are lawful. 
 Such restrictions cannot be used to hide human rights violations or otherwise 
unlawful or embarrassing activities. 
 Public confidence in the HIU, ICIR and other mechanisms outlined in the SHA 
can only be served by maximising the independence and decision-making 
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powers of the relevant institutions, free from state or other political 
interference. 
 Where disputes arise between the HIU and the Secretary of State or other 
government departments with regard to onward disclosure of information to 
families, and where such disputes cannot be resolved within a reasonable 
period of time, decisions on balancing competing imperatives should be made 
by an independent mechanism.
 This independent mechanism should be presided over by a judge, or judges, of 
at least high court level.
 To maximise public confidence in the process, criteria to inform the HIU and 
(where necessary) the independent judicial mechanism should be published in 
the legislation that establishes the Stormont House Agreement institutions. 
Those criteria should be devised from the relevant UK, European Court of 
Human Rights jurisprudence and other relevant international standards (see 
Appendix 1 draft criteria).
 The UK government has to date indicated a desire to use the term national 
security as the basis for seeking to redact sensitive information from HIU 
reports. However, national security is not defined in UK legislation. Using this 
term in the implementing legislation would require defining the term – at least 
for the purposes of dealing with the past regarding the conflict in or related to 
Northern Ireland.
 A more straightforward approach would be to excise the term national security 
from the enabling legislation and replace it in the legislation with the actual 
criteria for redaction. The term that is used in the Stormont House Agreement 
is ‘keeping people safe and secure’ that could be used as short hand for this 
duty.
 The independent judicial mechanism tasked with reviewing decisions on 
information redaction should involve an adversarial process wherein the 
respective arguments of the HIU, government departments and the public 
interest in disclosure would be tested.
 Such an adversarial process requires that all parties are represented by lawyers 
in whom they have full confidence. Steps should be taken to ensure ‘equality 
of arms’ between those lawyers representing the Secretary of State, the HIU 
Director, and the affected families. To that end, a pool of independent or ‘public 
interest’ advocates should be created. Families would then choose lawyers 
from that pool to represent their interests before the independent judicial 
mechanism. These lawyers would be vetted to ensure that they could access to 
all sensitive materials. Protocols should be developed to allow these advocates 
to provide a ‘gist’ of the proceedings to the families, their lawyers, and NGOs 
supporting them as part of taking their instructions (see further below).
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 Senior judicial personnel with relevant knowledge and experience, in either the 
jurisdiction or elsewhere, should staff the independent judicial mechanism. The 
appointed judge(s) must be capable of commanding public confidence and 
support. The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, in consultation with the 
British and Irish governments, should appointed the judge(s). Other 
appropriate international institutional stakeholders should also be consulted, 
including the UN Special Rapporteur on Promotion of Truth, Justice, 
Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence and the Council of Europe 
Commissioner on Human Rights.
 The detailed reasoning for the decision taken by the independent judicial 
mechanism should be published, subject to the same redaction criteria.
 If a decision is taken to redact sensitive information from a report to families, 
the redactions must be the minimum necessary to materially reduce the risk of 
death or harm to the specified persons concerned and proportionate to the level 
of risk when balanced against the public interest in disclosure. As is the case 
with reports issued by the Office of the Police Ombudsman, such redactions 
should only relate to the narrative or ‘findings’ elements of HIU report and not 
to the conclusions reached. Such redactions cannot be used to obscure or block 
information below the minimum disclosure requirements as detailed in 
Appendix One.
 All steps should be taken to minimise the potential for vexatious challenges to 
the decision of the independent judicial mechanism. One way to minimise such 
challenges would be to include a statutory appeal mechanism within the 
enabling legislation with a right of appeal to a higher judicial authority (e.g. the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal) with the grounds for appeal specified in 
that legislation.
4 
Proposed Model for Information Redaction under the 
Stormont House Agreement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 1: 
Investigation & Recommendation Issued to HIU 
Panel 
Stage 2: 
Preliminary Decision by Director 
(advised by staff on human rights & risk 
assessment) 
 
 
Stage 3: 
State informed of preliminary indications of 
sensitive information to be included in 
report 
 
Stage 4: 
Independent judicial mechanism with 
adversarial process to decide on: 
 
a) Sec of State challenges or 
b) HIU challenge or 
c) Family challenge to redactions 
 
 
 
Families notified 
if any redactions 
proposed 
 
State has x weeks 
to challenge 
inclusions; if 
challenge not 
lodged in time, 
report issued to 
families 
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Stage One: HIU Investigation and Recommendation 
HIU investigation team conducts investigation and drafts case report findings for families. 
The enabling legislation should specify the assumption that all relevant information shall be 
provided to families, subject only to the duty to keep people safe and secure. Draft reports 
shall indicate whether any ‘sensitive information’ is included relevant to the death(s) under 
investigation. 
 
Stage Two: Preliminary Decision by HIU 
Advised by an appropriate panel, the HIU Director shall consider whether the sensitive 
information should be included in the report. That panel shall include a Human Rights Advisor 
and an Advisor on Public Safety and Security. The Policing Board will appoint the panel 
members. The panel shall balance the public interest and families’ truth-recovery related 
rights against the duty to keep people safe and secure. 
 
Stage Three: Preliminary Indication on Sensitive Information and Space for 
Resolution of any Disputes 
The HIU Director shall inform the Secretary of State of the intent to use any sensitive 
information in the report and shall specify which sensitive information is intended to be used. 
The Secretary of State shall have a specified period to respond; otherwise, the report including 
the sensitive information will be issued to the family. 
This stage may include provision for a time-limited resolution of any disputes between the 
HIU and the relevant authorities regarding the publication of sensitive information. 
If there are disputes between the HIU and the Secretary of State relating to the publication of 
any sensitive information that cannot be resolved, either the HIU or the Secretary of State may 
refer the matter to an independent judicial mechanism. Affected families members shall have 
a similar right of referral to the independent judicial mechanism. 
 
Stage Four: Independent Judicial Mechanism to Review HIU Decision re 
Sensitive Information Redaction or Inclusion 
Once engaged, the independent judicial mechanism would hear arguments on the merits 
regarding redaction or disclosure of sensitive information in reports destined to go to families 
and make binding determinations. This would be substantial review rather than a review of 
the decision-making process. In a review, the senior judge or judges would examine the 
granular detail of the sensitive information to be included or redacted. Any element of the 
hearing that relates to sensitive information would be held in camera. Throughout, the review 
would be an adversarial process with the respective interests of the Secretary of State, the HIU 
and the families’ interests in disclosure being legally represented. The criteria by which the 
independent judicial mechanism shall make its determination will be published in the 
enabling legislation (see Appendix One). The detailed reasoning for the judicial decision taken 
shall be published, subject to the duty to keep people safe and secure. The independent 
judicial mechanism shall determine whether the relevant sensitive information should be 
included or redacted and instruct the HIU accordingly. 
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As far as is legally possible, the enabling legislation should seek to narrow the grounds for 
vexatious challenges to the independent judicial mechanism. One effective way of doing this 
would be through incorporating a statutory appeal mechanism in the legislation providing 
for the ability to appeal a decision of the judicial mechanism to a higher judicial authority (e.g. 
the Appeal Court of NI) on a range of appropriately specified grounds. 
 
The Legal Representation of Families 
To ensure that the rights of families are properly protected, and in particular, that they have 
‘equality of arms’ before the independent judicial mechanism, a process should be devised 
whereby lawyers representing their interests and the public interest in disclosure can play a 
full part in the discussion of sensitive information before the independent judicial mechanism. 
Having considered a number of alternatives, the following option has been agreed as the 
minimum required to ensure equality of arms for affected families. It would involve 
appointing an ‘Independent Advocate’ or ‘Public Interest Advocate’ to represent the interests 
of families in the independent judicial mechanism.1 
 A pool of suitably qualified human rights lawyers should be created to take on this 
function. 
 The lawyers in this pool would be vetted to the required degree. 
 Families, in consultation with their lawyers, would then chose which lawyer or 
lawyers from the pool they would wish to represent their interests before the 
Independent Judicial Mechanism. 
 Once selected, these lawyers would have full access to all of the sensitive information 
that is seen by the judge or judges and the legal representatives of the HIU and the 
Secretary of State. They would be able to participate fully in the work of the 
independent judicial mechanism. 
 Appropriate protocols would be developed to ensure that the vetted lawyers 
appearing before the Independent Judicial Mechanism could provide a ‘gist’ of the 
 
 
1 This option would be based, in part, on public interest immunity (PII) hearings, where public interest 
advocates are appointed by the court to assist with ex parte PII claims. The role of the public interest 
advocate is to represent the public interest in the disclosure of documents/information, providing a 
counterweight to the government counsel in PII hearings that represents the public interest in non- 
disclosure (usually on national security grounds). The public interest advocate is appointed by the court 
to represent ‘the public interest that the administration of justice shall not be frustrated by the withholding of 
documents which must be produced if justice is to be done’ (Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 per Lord Reid 
at 940). This role must be distinguished from the role of Special Advocates. Special Advocates are used 
in closed proceedings in the UK including in appeals against immigration decisions and hearings on 
detention and control orders. In such settings, once a Special Advocate has seen the ‘closed material’, 
s/he is unable to have contact with the individual, or the individual’s solicitor, in whose interests they 
are acting. This system has been the subject of significant criticism including by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, a major Justice Report and Special Advocates themselves who have 
highlighted the ‘fundamental unfairness of the system within which they operate.’ See further Amnesty 
International (2012) Submission to the Joint Committee on Human Rights Justice and Security Green Paper. 
London: Amnesty International. 
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discussions to unvetted lawyers representing families without disclosing sensitive 
information that might jeopardise the responsibilities to keep people safe and secure. 
 It would be necessary to ensure that the independent or public interest advocates 
lawyers are appropriately resourced both individually and collectively (e.g. in terms 
of administration, research, IT support etc.) to ensure that they are able to carry out 
their duties properly.
 The sharing of experiences amongst this pool of advocates would be encouraged as an 
important counter-weight to the Secretary of State’s lawyers in these proceedings.


 
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
Appendix 
1 
Keeping People Safe and Secure: Draft Criteria for Restrictions 
on Disclosure from the HIU to Families 
 
Introduction 
 
There will be a general presumption of disclosure of all relevant information in the 
possession of the HIU to families, subject only to the duty not to prejudice the 
administration of justice and the criteria detailed below. In circumstances where 
the HIU have concerns regarding whether the disclosure of information could 
jeopardise the administration of justice (i.e. a possible prosecution or prosecution 
with a reasonable chance of success), the HIU shall seek the advice and guidance 
of the DPP as to whether particular information should be included in a family 
report or indeed whether any family report should be issued in advance of a 
pending or ongoing prosecution. 
 
Extent of Disclosure 
 
In cases where the information reveals evidence of human rights abuses, criminal 
activity and misconduct by act or omission by any person, the information 
disclosed to the families shall, in all circumstances where relevant information 
exists, be sufficient to establish in general what measures might reasonably be 
taken to prevent recurrence and, without prejudice to that generality, in 
particular to: 
 
a) Identify the organisation, group, or state agency involved. 
b) Describe the nature of the wrongdoing including; 
i) The nature of acts of commission or omission. 
ii) Whether any relevant action or omission by a public authority was 
lawful (including, in particular, whether any deliberate use of force 
was justified in the circumstances). 
iii) Whether any action or omission of a perpetrator was carried out 
with the knowledge or encouragement of, or in collusion with, a 
Proposed Model for Information Redaction under the 
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public authority. 
iv) Whether the actions investigated had or may have been wholly or 
partly motivated by racial, religious, or other sectarian factors. 
c) Make clear the chains of command of the persons directly involved in the 
wrongdoing and, in the case of state involvement, the supervisory 
systems, or lack of them, that existed. 
d) Indicate whether the actions investigated were or may have been 
connected with other offences or actions (whether or not already 
investigated), and 
e) Detail the legislative, regulatory or policy gaps that allowed the wrongdoing 
to occur. 
 
The above elements represent a minimum level of disclosure. 
Redactions Of Sensitive Information  
Article 2  The Duty to Protect Life 
No ‘sensitive information’ shall be provided in a HIU report to a family that might 
present a real and immediate threat to the life of an identified individual or 
individuals from the criminal acts of a third party. 
The first ground for restrictions on disclosure is the duty on the state to prevent 
harm to individuals deriving from Article 2 of the ECHR. The “floor” of the 
Article 2 substantive obligation on the state to protect life is the Osman test. The 
full test is that if “the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the 
existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals 
from the criminal acts of a third party and ... they failed to take measures within the scope 
of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk,” 
they have failed to meet their Article 2 obligation.1 The HIU Panel and the 
Independent Judicial Mechanism would have to determine, in the context of the 
presumption of full disclosure of information to families gathered in the course of 
a HIU investigation, whether the redaction of specified sensitive material was 
required in order to mitigate a real and immediate risk to the life of an individual 
or individuals. 
 
Article 3 The Duty to Prevent Harm to Individuals 
The state also has a positive duty to prevent harm to individuals under Articles 3 
of the ECHR. In relation to restrictions on disclosure, this duty should be 
interpreted in the following way: 
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Duty is to individuals 
The risk of harm must be to an identified individual or individuals, not a class of 
persons. 
 
The harm to be prevented 
The harm to be prevented includes physical or specific psychological injury or 
harassment or intimidation likely to reach the threshold of inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 
 
The risk 
There must be a direct, foreseeable, and describable link between the proposed disclosure 
and the anticipated harm. That means that the risk must be imminent or in the foreseeable 
future and wholly created or materially enhanced by the proposed disclosure.  
 
The nature and source of the threat 
The threat must be to carry out harm as defined above through criminal acts. The 
source of the threat must be either an identified individual or individuals or a 
clearly definable group that in either case has demonstrated the willingness and 
capability to carry out threats as described to either the individual(s) concerned 
or to a defined class of persons to which the individual(s) arguably at risk belong. 
 
Protection of operational counter-terrorist methodologies and 
effectiveness 
On the basis that under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR it may be necessary and 
proportionate, some information may be redacted from HIU reports to protect 
the effectiveness of operational methods of the police and other security services 
which are in current use and which are lawful - i.e. obsolete or “arguably 
illegitimate”2 methods cannot be concealed by restrictions on disclosure. 
Information about contemporary, legitimate operational methods must not 
already be in the public domain to qualify for redaction. It must also be 
demonstrated that the proposed disclosure would, in fact, in the foreseeable 
future, damage the operational effectiveness of the method in question in such a 
way as to place a person or persons at a real and immediate risk of serious harm. 
In general, the reasons for restricting disclosure under this criterion must be 
“particularly convincing and weighty.”3 
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The Redactions 
Any redaction of information must be the minimum that is necessary to materially 
reduce the risk of death or harm to the specified persons concerned and 
proportionate to the level of risk when balanced against the public interest in 
disclosure. As is the case with reports issued by the Office of the Police 
Ombudsman, such redactions should only relate to the narrative or ‘findings’ 
elements of HIU report and not to the Conclusions reached. Such redactions 
cannot be used to obscure or block the disclosure of information below the 
minimum necessary elements of information outlined above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 See paragraph 116, Osman v UK (87/1997/871/1083), ECHR Judgment 28 October 1998 
2 Dil and Others v Commissioner of Police [2014] EWHC 2184 (QB), para 42 
3  Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom (1999) 
 
